The Guardian view on a race for missile supremacy: competition fuels a dangerous escalation | Editorial

Wellfive years ago, the collapse of a landmark Cold War arms treaty opened Pandora’s box, unleashing shaped like a rocket furies that hit Ukraine. The 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). ended when the US withdrewciting Russian violations since 2014. under Vladimir Putin. While abandoning the treaty was in line with the broader opposition to arms control of the first Trump administration, continuing to pressure Mr. Putin to abide by it would have been the wiser course.

On target are Kyiv’s hypersonic forces Nutcracker missile and ballistic Iskander rocket. Both can carry a nuclear warhead and would be banned under the INF Treaty. These weapons signal an alarming return to Cold War style posing eye to eyewith great powers increasing their military capacity. Their use underscores Moscow’s accelerated missile development. But it also raises questions about the implications of a nuclear-tipped Oreshnik missile – capable of hitting European capitals within 12 to 16 minutes – for NATO security.

Deploying such missiles runs the risk of being abandoned arms control. The Cold War INF Treaty, banning land-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 km, limited nuclear escalation in Europe. Its expiration, as the UN warned, removed “an invaluable deterrent to nuclear war.” History offers lessons. In 1983 US plans to deploy such missiles in Europe – including Britain – sparked mass protests. Tensions peaked this year during the “A capable shooter” exercise misinterpreted by Moscow as preparation for nuclear war. Alarmed, Ronald Reagan eased fears, leading to the INF Treaty and broader arms reductions.

Unlike Mr. Reagan, the US president-elect is not interested in such statesmanship. Mr. Putin, more insecure than his Soviet predecessors, embraces handlerecently lowering Russia’s nuclear threshold. Under Barack Obama, arms control advanced with then-Russian leader Dmitry Medvedev signing the New Start Treaty limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads. But Mr. Putin’s return to power in 2012. froze progress by subsequent transaction.

One of the reasons for American indifference to the preservation of the INF Treaty was its irrelevance to China, which was not a signatory and had developed medium range missiles. This may also explain why the Biden administration maintained Mr. Trump’s approach, investing heavily in nuclear weapons. This shift released The US to develop weapons aimed at defending Taiwan from a potential Chinese invasion. In Europe, the US also announced plans to deploy long-range weapons in Germany by 2026, followed quickly by continental powers revealing plans for “deep fire” capabilities.

The looming end of A new beginning the contract in 2026. calls for urgent cooperation between Moscow and Washington to prevent an arms race. Despite the obviousness of the US President-elect understanding with Mr. Putin, deep-seated mistrust poses significant obstacles to new arms control talks. To avoid repeating the mistakes of history, Western leaders must prioritize negotiations with both Russia and China. Renewed accumulation of weaponswith its heightened risks of accident and catastrophic conflict, is an existential threat of unparalleled immediacy. Without swift action, unchecked competition will eclipse any strategic gains from a military posture.